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Turmoil and Uncertainty:  
Israel and the New Middle East
Yaniv Voller
Many observers consider Israel the biggest loser of the recent political turmoil and dramatic changes in Arab states. With the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, Israel has now lost 
a leader who shared with it a desire for maintaining the ‘stable’ status quo, and who was 
willing to accept, if grudgingly, Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. Now Israel is facing the rise 
of Islamist parties-led governments across the region, not only in Egypt and Tunisia, but also 
in non-revolutionary states, such as Morocco and Kuwait. Although cautious in their rhetoric 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, these new governments could hardly be described as adhering 
to the Israeli-inspired regional status quo. These geopolitical changes in the Middle East have 
therefore forced Israel to reassess its current strategic arrangements amid its two immediate 
security threats: the Iranian nuclear programme and the emerging cold war in the region over 
that issue; and the risk of deterioration on the Palestinian front.
ISRAEL AND THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE ARAB WORLD 
The popular commentary that argues that Israel was caught unprepared by the political turmoil in the 
Middle East is rather inaccurate. The lessons of the Iranian Revolution, which resulted in Israel losing 
one of its most important allies in the region, has been guiding the Israeli intelligence sector since 1979. 
As early as 2006, two senior Israeli Defence Forces officers publicly declared that the regimes in both 
Egypt and Jordan faced existential threats and might disappear from the regional political map. These 
statements elicited harsh responses from Cairo and Amman, and were quickly censured by the Israeli 
government. Yet they demonstrate Israel’s constant concern about the stability of its allies. Based on both 
its past experience and its general perception of Middle Eastern politics, the Israeli intelligence community 
assumed that educated and internet-savvy middle class protests will soon give way to Islamist politicians. 
For this reason, the Likud government’s immediate response involved a very thinly veiled appeal to 
Western governments to support the existing regimes. As a result, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu 
and his cabinet, already viewed as the most hawkish in Israel’s history, now came to be portrayed as a 
reactionary force in the region, disengaged from reality and embroiled in conspiracy with regional despots.
The rise of Islamist parties in the elections in Egypt, Tunisia and other states was hence something of a 
relief for the Israeli government. These parties’ antipathy toward the existence of the Jewish state and 
their hostility toward any signs of normalisation with it, buttressed by their leadership’s ambiguity with 
regard to the future of existing cooperation agreements with Israel, allowed the Israeli government to 
rebuke the international community for its initial enthusiasm and to once again underline the fragility 
of prevailing peace agreements that involve territorial compromise. Instability in some of the post-
revolutionary regimes, and images from the near-civil war in Bahrain, and what is evolving into a civil 
war in Syria, have further reinforced Israel’s sense of isolation and underpinned its justifications for 
unilateralism in the region.
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This sense of relief, however, was short-lived. 
Israel faces several major threats and the new 
reality necessitated a reconsideration of existing 
security arrangements. Israel has faced, or at least 
perceived itself to be facing, existential threats since 
its inception. Therefore, Israeli foreign policy and 
security arrangements have always been relatively 
flexible, oriented toward ad-hoc alliances against a 
major regional threat. Currently Israel is facing two 
major threats, sometimes overlapping and sometimes 
detached: the Iranian threat, which has dominated 
Israel’s foreign policy-making since the 1990s; and 
the risk of new escalation on the Palestinian front. 
ISRAEL’S OVERARCHING SECURITY CONCERN: 
IRAN
The debate taking place in Israel’s public media 
demonstrates that the Iranian threat is perceived 
as the most immediate issue facing the Israeli state. 
This threat carries two particular elements: the first is 
the Islamic Republic’s explicit and vocal objection to 
Israel’s existence, which has been further enhanced by 
the anti-Semitic discourse of its incumbent president, 
Mahmud Ahmedinejad. Iranian hostility toward Israel 
has gone beyond mere rhetorical attacks against the 
‘Zionist entity,’ taking the form of military and financial 
support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip. In addition, Iran is also held responsible by 
several security agencies for attacks against Jewish and 
Israeli targets across the globe, for example the recent 
attacks against Israeli diplomatic targets in New Delhi 
and Bangkok, as well as the attacks against Jewish and 
Israeli targets in Buenos Aires during the early 1990s. 
The second element that turns Iran into a major security 
threat is its ongoing nuclear programme and alleged 
aspiration for obtaining nuclear weapons technology. 
It is this second element that makes deterioration into 
a full scale war a tangible proposition.
Although the Iranian government has denied it aspires 
to nuclear weapons capability, the Israeli, American, 
British, German and French governments, among others, 
suspect that Iran’s final goal is achieving such capability. 
This assessment is based on several indications. 
First, Iran failed to report the construction of two 
nuclear sites to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), as required by the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Second, in a visit by IAEA inspectors to these 
sites after their discovery, they revealed a significant 
number of centrifuges, as well as heavy water facilities. 
Moreover, in 2011 the Iranian government declared 
the instalment of new sets of centrifuges, which would 
allow 20 percent uranium enrichment, the threshold 
level for military uses. Finally, several reports by the 
IAEA, as well as Israeli and other Western intelligence 
agencies, have indicated that Iran has conducted 
experiments in the use of nuclear technology for 
military purposes.
In addition to the evident Iranian enmity toward Israel, 
the government in Jerusalem, as well as Israeli security 
experts, have suggested several other justifications 
for viewing Iran not only as an Israeli, but also a 
regional and global threat. First, Iran is known to 
have ballistic missiles whose range reaches not only 
Tel Aviv, but various European capitals. Moreover, 
the Iranian government, some argue, is an irrational 
actor driven by religious zeal; therefore, deterrence 
cannot be reliably applied in the Iranian case. Even 
if Iran might not launch nuclear missiles at Israel, 
its agents still might plant ‘dirty bombs’ in Israel, 
causing mass casualties and spreading panic. Finally, 
Israeli and other analysts have underlined the danger 
of nuclearising the Middle East. Regardless of Iran’s 
intentions, its nuclear ambitions would push other 
states in the region, and particularly the militarily 
vulnerable but financially capable Gulf monarchies, 
to acquire nuclear capabilities as well. And again, due 
to the unpredictability of the regional regimes, from 
the Israeli perspective, and the inability to coordinate 
relations between the different actors effectively, the 
logic of a multipolar Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD) system of deterrence does not hold.
Given Israel’s assumption that Iran is now seeking nuclear 
weapons capability, the questions that remain are: 
how far is Iran from obtaining such capabilities; 
can Iranian nuclear proliferation be stopped; and, 
how can it be stopped?
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The Israeli government’s preferred solution to the 
perceived Iranian threat is a direct Israeli attack on 
Iranian nuclear facilities, a tactic very much inspired 
by Israel’s successful attack on the Iraqi Osirak 
Nuclear reactor in 1981. Such a plan encounters 
several difficulties, the most important of which is 
domestic opposition within Israel to such a move. 
Several senior Israeli security figures, including former 
heads of Mossad Ephraim Halevi and Meir Dagan, have 
come out publicly against such military adventurism, 
arguing that Israel does not have the capabilities to 
launch such an operation, and that any Iranian reprisal 
might be devastating. Rather, these individuals have 
suggested that Israel should continue the existing 
line of operation, which includes (allegedly) the 
assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists; sabotaging 
the Iranian nuclear facilities through cyber-attacks such 
as the Stuxnet worm; and sponsoring local proxies such 
as the opposition movement Mujahedin-e Khalq and 
Kurdish rebels. A further hindrance is American and 
European discomfort with regard to an Israeli attack 
on Iran. Rather than a direct conflict, which is bound 
to draw in the US and perhaps other Western states, 
the Obama administration and its European allies 
have advocated tightening economic sanctions, with 
the hope of crippling the government and instigating 
public unrest. Russian and Chinese objections to 
military intervention in Iran further deters the United 
States and the European Union from going down the 
military route, or alternatively, supporting Israel in the 
aftermath of such an attack.
Israel, however, is not the only regional actor to be 
worried about the implications of a nuclear Iran. 
Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
states have all been following the Iranian nuclear 
programme with great anxiety. King Abdullah II of 
Jordan warned of the ‘Shia Crescent’ in the aftermath 
of the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq in 2003, 
referring to attempts to increase Iranian influence 
both in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, namely 
Lebanon and the Gaza strip. This alleged sphere of 
influence often also includes Syria, Iran’s traditional ally 
in the region. Much like Israel, the above states, often 
defined collectively as the ‘moderate Arab states,’ have 
pushed for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Fearing 
domestic public opinion, however, such demands have 
been made in secret, with no direct reference to Israel 
leading the attacks. Nevertheless, without American 
support, the prospects for a military rollback of Iran’s 
nuclear programme remain low.
The current situation, therefore, is best characterised 
as a cold war between Iran and its allies, on one 
side, and Israel and the so-called moderate Arab 
states, backed by the US, on the other. The summer 
2006 confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah was 
therefore perceived as a proxy-war within this wider 
strategic context, not only by Israel but also by Egypt, 
Jordan and the Gulf states, which not only avoided 
condemning Israel, but in fact pointed to Hezbollah 
as the main culprit. Similarly, the 2008-9 Gaza War, 
in which Israel invaded the Gaza Strip resulting in a 
relatively high number of civilian casualties, elicited 
only mild Arab condemnation of Israel, and in the case 
of Egypt even an unprecedented mutual condemnation 
of Hamas along-side Israel. This has served Israeli and 
foreign commentators to believe that this regional cold 
war could actually serve as a platform for Israeli-Arab 
reconciliation and as a catalyst for the continuation 
of the peace process. 
THE UNDERLYING SORE: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN 
DISPUTE
The second strategic threat facing Israel is that of 
the renewal of violence in the occupied territories. 
Negotiations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) have 
stagnated under the Likud government and levels of 
distrust and mutual hostility are unprecedented. The 
Israeli government has largely failed to comply with 
the international demands to freeze building in the 
settlements in Eastern Jerusalem and is not likely to 
do so. The Hamas government in the Gaza Strip is still 
under an IDF blockade, which whilst achieving some of 
Israel’s main goals, namely a significant reduction in the 
number of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip toward 
Israeli towns and settlements on the border line, 
has also further increased hostility and consequently 
enhanced the popularity of Hamas and its ideological 
objection to any recognition of Israel.
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In an attempt to resolve this impasse, the PA decided 
to declare official Palestinian independence and seek 
recognition in the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council in September 2011. Eventually, the Palestinian 
leadership agreed to postpone its plan, following 
American pressure and guarantees from Israel to 
renew negotiations. Yet this can hardly be considered 
a diplomatic victory for Israel. International support 
for such unilateral Palestinian diplomacy, as well as 
domestic enthusiasm within the occupied territories, 
were a sharp reminder of the volatility of the situation. 
Moreover, Israeli objections to such moves might 
drive Hamas to conduct attacks against targets within 
Israel, as it chose to do in the past. The memories of 
the second intifada and its demoralising effects are 
still fresh in the minds of many Israelis and the fear 
of deterioration is still prevalent.
Since Iran is perceived as the preeminent security threat 
facing Israel, many within the Israeli security apparatus 
have actually come to see a peace agreement with the 
Palestinian Authority as a necessary step to further 
consolidate a regional coalition against Iran. Others, 
nonetheless, maintain that as long as Hamas, Iran’s ally, 
is still in power in the Gaza Strip, such reconciliation 
cannot take place.
 
ISRAEL AND THE ARAB SPRING
Due to the proximity of events and the rapid political 
changes in surrounding countries, Israel has been 
careful in its statements to date on the events of the 
Arab Spring. Yet the turmoil in the Arab world has had 
a direct impact on Israeli foreign policy, in particular 
with regard to Israel’s security concerns.
On the Palestinian front, notwithstanding its ambiguity 
about the prospects of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty, both the SCAF and the FJP-led government 
have made it clear that Mubarak’s tolerance of 
Israeli policies in the Gaza strip is to be revoked. 
The first, and at the moment the only major, sign 
for that has been the military’s decision to ease the 
blockade and allow greater freedom of movement 
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. So far, Egypt 
– whose influence over the Gaza strip has always 
been immense – is still playing the role of a mediator 
between Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. 
Yet Egypt’s willingness to play this role is sure to 
come under severe scrutiny in future cases of clashes 
between Hamas and Israel.
The events of the Arab Spring have also forced other 
Arab governments, in particular the so-called moderate 
axis, to reconsider their policies toward Israel, namely 
the secret but not so discreet de facto (and in some 
cases such as Qatar and Oman, de jure) recognition of 
Israel, and collaboration with the Israeli government in 
the fields of security and trade. More pressured than 
ever to pacify their public, the conservative regimes 
in the region are in dire need of political causes to 
demonstrate their attentiveness to public opinion. 
Since the Palestinian cause is a key theme in Arab 
political discourse, it would be safe to assume that in 
the case of an escalation, those Arab regimes will be 
less lenient toward Israel than in previous years. This 
means further pressure on Israel to reconsider attacks 
in the occupied territories in the near future. Such 
pressure may also have an impact on the moderate 
axis’ willingness to cooperate with Israel vis-à-vis the 
Iranian threat. So far Israel has relied on silent Arab 
acquiescence for military strikes against Iran, under 
the assumption that such an attack would also serve 
Egyptian, Jordanian and GCC interests. Yet, in light 
of the current atmosphere in the Arab states and 
the fear of unrest sparking new attempts at regime 
change, it is doubtful that Arab regimes will want 
to be associated with an attack on another Muslim 
country, even if Shia. 
Perhaps the most salient impact the recent turmoil 
in the Arab world will have on Israeli policy-making 
is the unfolding civil war in Syria. Still a major actor 
in the front against normalisation with Israel, Syria 
plays a key-role in the region, mainly as a channel 
of weapons and funds from Iran to Hezbollah. It is 
generally assumed that such policy is part of Syria’s 
constant effort to put pressure on Israel to sign a 
peace agreement with Syria which would bring the 
Golan Heights, occupied by Israel in 1967 under 
Syrian control.
Since the situation remains in flux at the time of 
writing these lines it is impossible to predict the 
fate of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Yet, there are 
certain potential scenarios that can be discussed 
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with relation to Israel. If the Ba’ath regime survives (with or without Bashar al-Assad), one may assume that 
the alliance with Iran and the Hezbollah would not change dramatically. However, in the case of the collapse 
of the Assad regime, any new government may well abandon its support for Hezbollah, either on the basis 
of ideological resentment toward the radical Shia movement, the need to concentrate on Syrian internal 
affairs, or a desire to attract international aid.
Much to its frustration, there is not much Israel can actually do to affect the situation in Syria. Although it has 
often been argued that the Israeli government prefers the survival of the ‘known evil’ of the Assad regime, 
this is rather inaccurate. The constant description of the Syrian-Israeli border as Israel’s most tranquil border 
region should be rejected based on Syria’s alliance with Iran and its use of Hezbollah as a proxy against 
Israel. Even if its Ba’ath regime survives the current conflict, Syria has probably lost its legitimacy to make 
any concessions to Israel and sign a peace-agreement in the near future. A new regime, even if inherently 
hostile toward Israel, might at least be focused more on rebuilding Syria, rather than reasserting its nationalist 
credentials by means of a military adventure against Israel. Moreover, dependence on international aid from 
the Gulf States might drive any new regime to accept the ad-hoc arrangements between Israel and the other 
regional actors. Much to its frustration, there is not much Israel can do, since any direct Israeli intervention 
would necessarily delegitimise any incoming regime.
After nearly a decade of relative stability, then, Israel is once again facing a conundrum. The tendency in 
such situations is to further entrench in unilateralism. Yet, the price of such unilateralism can be higher than 
ever, a fact which Israeli government is becoming painfully aware of. Though no Israeli government has been 
prepared to publicly acknowledge it, Israel still relies heavily on American material, and even more so moral, 
support. Although Israel has acted unilaterally in the past, launching a war that could potentially destabilise 
the entire region, and the global economy, in a presidential election year, would put the special relationship 
between the two countries to an unprecedented test. ■
